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Sensing the City: Designing for Privacy and Trust in the Internet of Things 
 
Introduction 
 The British Standards Institute has defined the ‘smart city’ as one which includes, “effective 
integration of physical, digital and human systems in the built environment to deliver a sustainable, 
prosperous and inclusive future for its citizens (British Standards Institution 2014).” Such integration is 
generally understood to have a significant emphasis on technology to inform physical and human 
systems, with the use of sensor technologies a key component of this process. Park et al. have stated that, 
“To prepare the basic infrastructure of a smart city, various sensors, support technologies, and 
background environments are essential and are being employed in urban areas. Among them, the 
Internet of Things (IoT) is considered one of the most important aspects for the successful 
implementation of a smart city (Park, del Pobil and Kwon 2018).” Such integration is, however, not 
without its detractors, and some key smart city issues have thus far received inadequate attention, 
including privacy and trust in IoT contexts. These gaps are evident in such recent experiences as the public 
backlash against Sidewalk Lab’s2 proposed redevelopment of a portion of the Toronto waterfront, which 
was criticised for being overly opaque regarding practices surrounding data collection, use, and ownership 
(McLeod 2018).  
 The IoT is a complex topic to approach from the viewpoint of trust; however, Sicari et al. argue that, 
“…trust is a fundamental issue since the IoT environment is characterized by different devices which have 
to process and handle the data in compliance with user needs and rights (Sicari, et al. 2015).” Patel and 
Patel define IoT systems as “…a concept and a paradigm that considers pervasive presence in the 
environment of a variety of things/objects that through wireless and wired connections and unique 
addressing schemes are able to interact with each other and cooperate with other things/objects to 
 
2 Sidewalk Lab is a subsidiary of Google’s parent company, Alphabet. 
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create new applications/services and reach common goals (Patel and Patel 2016).” Given these 
characteristics, traditional markers of trust, such as identifiability of involved parties, uncertainty and risk, 
and faith in honesty and benevolence (Siau and Shen 2003), may be absent. In such cases, the underlying 
trust that one has towards more generalised actors (such as government or private companies) may serve 
as a basis for decisions regarding trust under assumed conditions (Gao and Bai 2014).  
In the TrustLens3 project, we explore issues of privacy and trust as they relate to the Internet of 
Things from a viewpoint that considers these more generalised perceptions of trust and familiarity with 
technology. Through this, we can better our understanding of both the public’s perceptions of risk, and 
preferences regarding its communication with respect to devices present in public spaces. In such a 
context, we assume that the public have little actual control over the installation of devices (unlike control 
they may have in their homes or other private spaces), or knowledge of the ecosystem of data collection, 
use and exchange. In a 2018 survey conducted in the United Kingdom, we explored these issues as they 
relate to trust, data privacy, and perceptions of risk with respect to IoT applications, with the expectation 
of applying our findings to methods that may be used to better encourage trust in the IoT. The survey also 
asked participants to indicate their informational desires regarding public IoT deployments, to provide a 
foundational understanding of transparency requirements as a facilitator for trust.  
In this paper, we present an overview of the survey findings, with particular attention to the 
different preferences revealed across categories of participants; namely, those displaying high, medium, 
or low levels of trust. Through doing so, we aim to introduce more detailed information on the ways in 
which user preferences regarding trust, willingness to share data, and privacy concerns may be 
incorporated into the deployment and communication of practices regarding public space IoT 






Privacy and Trust 
The concepts of privacy and trust are generally considered to be multidimensional, with a variety of 
personal and contextual factors that may influence people’s perceptions. In recognition of the variance of 
privacy preferences demonstrated by consumers, Alan Westin has conducted a series of surveys over time 
and used these to develop privacy indices, which segment people into clusters of high privacy concern 
(termed privacy ‘Fundamentalists’), moderate privacy concern (or privacy ‘Pragmatists’) and low privacy 
concern (or privacy ‘Unconcerned’) [(Westin et al. 2003) cited in (Kumaraguru and Cranor 2005)]. While 
this approach has been criticised as being too reductionist (particularly in (Martin and Nissenbaum 2016)), 
it does introduce a way of taking a clustering approach to assessing people’s overall privacy preferences, 
which may simplify further practices.  
In contrast to Westin, Nissenbaum’s concept of ‘contextual integrity’ speaks directly to variations in 
privacy preferences under changing conditions, particularly in the context of public spaces. She states 
that, “whether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a function of several variables, 
including the nature of the situation, or context; the nature of the information in relation to that context; 
the roles of agents receiving information; their relationships to information subjects; on what terms the 
information is shared by the subject; and the terms of further dissemination (Nissenbaum 2004).” 
Unfortunately, however, general practices regarding the protection of personal information do not always 
acknowledge these contexts, driven instead by the static application of privacy policies under a ‘notice 
and consent’ approach, which implies “…the individual whose personal data is being processed has—after 
being informed of the reason, context, and purpose of the processing—given consent (Cate and Mayer-
Schönberger 2013).”  
A mediating factor that may be introduced is that of trust, as indicated by Joinson et al., who found 
that “…privacy and trust at a situational level interact such that high trust compensates for low privacy, 
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and vice versa (Joinson, et al. 2010).” Trust in an actor and their practices may lead to a greater 
willingness to share information on the part of the consumer (Wirtz and Lwin 2009) (Taddei and Contena 
2013); however, such trust may be eroded in the absence of adequate information. In a study regarding 
the influence of privacy policies on consumer behaviour, for example, (Arcand, et al. 2007) found that the 
presence of a privacy policy at an online shop may increase consumers perceptions of control. However, 
for those who read the policy, significantly higher perceptions of control and trust were only seen if an 
‘opt-in’ format (in which the user is given more control over access to and management of her data) was 
used. 
Such a finding is concerning, particularly as privacy policies have become the de facto method of 
communicating data practices with consumers (Kelley, et al. 2010). Such polices, in line with the notice 
and consent model described above, attempt to provide a standard synthesis of data practices to the 
consumer; however, such approaches have experienced increasing criticism over time. With respect to 
online practices, for example, Hetcher argues that, “…privacy policies are not an adequate means to 
accomplish the task of protecting website visitors from the invasive practices of websites (Hetcher 2000).” 
Privacy policies have been found to be time consuming to read (McDonald and Cranor 2008); overly 
complex for the average reader (Jensen and Potts 2004) (Cottrill and Thakuriah 2013); and generally 
inadequate for conveying data practices to the consumer (Solove 2013) (Pollach 2007). As noted by 
Pollach, “…these documents are written in a manner that protects companies against privacy lawsuits by 
integrating privacy legislation that regulates, for example, information gathered from children,… financial 
data,…and medical records,… or state legislation such as California’s Online Privacy Protection Act. In 
addition, Internet users have been found not to read online privacy policies because they find them too 
legalistic and therefore difficult to understand (Pollach 2007).” A compounding concern in an IoT context 
is that, in addition to their potential inadequacy, access to privacy policies may not be immediately 
evident given the distributed and public nature of sensors. 
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Privacy and Trust in the IoT 
As noted above, the privacy policy approach described above is likely inadequate for addressing 
concerns evident in the IoT, particularly when deployed in the public sphere. As described by Peppet, 
“…four inherent aspects of sensor-based technologies – the compounding effects of what computer 
scientists call "sensor fusion," the near impossibility of truly de-identifying sensor data, the likelihood that 
Internet of Things devices will be inherently prone to security flaws, and the difficulty of meaningful 
consumer consent in this context – create very real discrimination, privacy, security, and consent 
problems (Peppet 2014).” These considerations are all incompatible with a notice and consent approach 
to data privacy, as they underscore the implausibility of providing adequate communication of data 
collection practices (with reference to the collector, the data collected, and the use of this data) to allow 
for considered consent to be given.  
Such concerns are evident in cases such as the Sidewalk Lab example given above, as well as 
instances such as the Chicago Array of Things (AoT)4, which faced intensive public scrutiny regarding data 
collection and privacy practices. A report from an AoT workshop identified some of these considerations, 
noting the following as key areas of concern:  
“(1) the inability for an individual to easily opt in or out of participation in the AoT; (2) as a 
general purpose, research oriented, and continuously evolving platform, the AoT presents new 
challenges for privacy that aren’t present in previous sensor or technology deployments that are 
traditionally more task oriented (i.e. bridge monitoring sensors); and (3) data collected or 
processed by the AoT could include measurements that are generally considered public (i.e. air 
quality) and those that are often considered private (i.e. images, albeit AoT is designed without 
 
4 https://arrayofthings.github.io/  
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the capacity to store images beyond what is necessary to process them locally on the nodes) 
(Welch and Catlett 2015).” 
These concerns demonstrate the wide variety of privacy considerations evident in IoT systems, and reveal 
that there is a need for further attention to the subject. 
Privacy and the IoT in smart cities 
As indicated in the Sidewalk Labs and Array of Things examples described above, smart cities often imply 
sensed cities, with (Silva, Khan and Han 2018) indicating that, ‘The smart city is an application of the IoT 
(p. 697).’ Smart cities worldwide are seeing significant investment, with (Teale 2020) reporting findings 
from the International Data Corporation (IDC) that spending on smart city initiatives globally will total 
nearly US$124 billion in 2020. While such investment demonstrates great promise for enhancing smart 
cities, issues of privacy and trust remain open research questions, as identified in (Braun, et al. 2018), who 
state that ‘Smart cities must ensure individual privacy and security in order to ensure that its citizens will 
participate. If citizens are reluctant to participate, the core advantages of a smart city will dissolve (p. 
499).’ With smart city IoT sensors increasingly located in public spaces, developing trust through 
transparent practices is becoming increasingly complex. Developing appropriate methods of 
communicating data collection and use processes is key, particularly when collected data may be 
identifiable or when there is no opportunity to opt-out of data collection in a particular geographic space. 
However, while extensive research has been undertaken to enhance data privacy preservation and 
security in IoT systems (see, for example, (Bennati and Pournaras 2018); (Wang, et al. 2014); and (Davies, 
et al. 2016)), how these practices are communicated to the public has received significantly less attention. 
Summary 
As the above review demonstrates, privacy and trust are interrelated concepts that may 
demonstrate a wide variety of preferences depending on both the individual and the context. Current 
notice and consent practices, however, demonstrated most clearly through the use of privacy policies, do 
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not adequately address consumer needs with respect to their privacy and trust preferences. IoT systems 
deployed in public spaces as part of ‘smart city’ initiatives present a particularly complex case for privacy 
and trust issues, as they introduce uncertainties aligned with spatial deployment, integration into existing 
systems, and a lack of transparency regarding data collection and use practices. In the following sections, 
we describe and analyse a 2018 survey undertaken in the UK that was designed to evaluate consumer 
perceptions of risk and trust in IoT deployments, as well as determine what informational 
communications elements are required to engender trust in the IoT. 
 
Methodology 
The 20-question survey instrument was developed following an extensive literature review and a 
number of participatory research activities with the public, undertaken as part of the TrustLens project 
and reported in (Jacobs, et al. 2019). Initial IoT-related privacy and trust concerns identified by citizens 
during engagement activities were collected and checked against existing research (discussed above) to 
ensure that the survey addressed a comprehensive set of questions that could beneficially contribute to 
the design of effective communication practices in public IoT deployments.   
Survey Deployment 
The TrustLens survey was launched online on 21st November 2018 and concluded on 22nd 
November. To ensure a representative sample, recruitment activities were undertaken through a 
specialty survey company through a sub-contract. The target population consisted of United Kingdom 
residents aged 16 or over, or roughly 53,240,570 persons according to census records. 227 completed 
responses were received, giving a 95% confidence level, with a confidence interval of +/- 6.5. The 
geographic distribution of responses was fairly representative of the UK population (as determined by 
those who voluntarily provided the first four characters of their postcodes – 216/227) as seen in Fig. 1. 
Many respondents were clustered around larger cities such as London, Liverpool, Leeds, and Edinburgh; 
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however, a reasonable sample was also obtained from more rural and exurban areas. Summary statistics 
of the sample are included in Table 1 and demonstrate a good mix of respondents from a socio-
demographic perspective.  
 
Figure 1:  Map of survey respondents (4-character postcode limit) 
The survey was designed, first, to obtain an overall indication of people’s familiarity with ‘smart’ 
technologies, such as smartphones5 and other smart devices. Prior research has indicated that willingness 
to use technology is a complex construct, with trust, usefulness, and familiarity all contributing to overall 
attitudes (Pavlou 2003) (Gao and Bai 2014); thus, we utilised questions regarding adoption of various 
types of smart devices to serve as an indication of familiarity. The overall profile of awareness, ownership, 






5 Defined as: “A mobile phone that performs many of the functions of a computer, typically having a touchscreen interface, Internet access, and an operating 





Table 1: Summary Survey Demographics 
 












Prefer not to say 3 1.3%
Yearly Income Category Frequency Percent
<£10,000 36 15.9%
£10,000 - £24,999 70 30.8%
£25,000 - £49,999 74 32.6%
£50,000 - £74,000 12 5.3%
£75,000+ 7 3.1%
Prefer not to say 28 12.3%
Highest Education Level Completed Frequency Percent
Lower secondary school qualification (e.g. 
Standard Grade, O Grade, GCSE) 48 21.1%
Upper secondary school qualification (e.g. 
Highers or A levels) 64 28.2%
University or FE college qualification below 
a degree 28 12.3%
University undergraduate degree 46 20.3%
Graduate or professional degree 32 14.1%
None of these 4 1.8%
Prefer not to say 5 2.2%
Housing Tenure Frequency Percent
Own (with or without a mortgage) 145 63.9%
Rented from private landlord 32 14.1%
Rented from housing association or Council 40 17.6%
Other 1 0.4%




Figure 2: Awareness, ownership, and use of technology 
 
It is evident from these results that there is good awareness of smart devices, ranging from 
smartphones, which all respondents indicated familiarity with, with 80% reporting that they ‘own, and use 
frequently’, to internet connected toys, which 62% of respondents reported at least being familiar with. In 
terms of considerations leading to the decision to purchase (or not to purchase) such devices, as seen in 
Figure 3, most people reported a wide variety of factors related to the device itself (such as cost and 
convenience), the impacts of device use (such as safety and health impacts), and issues related to the 
providers of the device (such as data security and trust). Of note is that, while all factors were rated quite 
highly (all factors had over 50% of respondents indicating that they were “most” or “very” important), 
those related to Security, Privacy and Data Security were ranked most highly. This may be reflective of the 





Figure 3: Factors contributing to decisions regarding to purchase smart devices 
 
These initial findings provide an overall indication that the survey population is quite familiar with 
smart devices and may have various reasons for adopting or not adopting them. In the following section, 
we look more closely at issues related to trust and privacy to gain a better understanding of the 
preferences that may influence attitudes to IoT devices in public spaces. 
 
Survey Analysis 
Perceptions of Trust 
When considering the use of smart devices that may have the ability to collect detailed data on the 
user, a core concern is that of trust. In line with work undertaken by Westin (A. F. Westin 2003), survey 
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following three statements 
in order to gain a generalised baseline understanding of trust tendencies: 
 I think that most people can be trusted. 
 I believe most government agencies can be trusted. 
 I believe most private companies can be trusted. 
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The results shown in Figure 4 provide a useful indication of people’s beliefs overall with respect to 
different actors, which in turn may impact upon their degree of comfort with sharing data with these 
actors. It is notable that the patterns for each actor differ, with median values (where ‘Disagree 
completely’ = 1 and ‘Agree completely’ = 5) and standard deviations as follows: 
 Government agencies: 2.8062; 1.14728 
 Private companies: 2.7137; 1.07750 
 People: 3.0881; 1.06480 
 
Figure 4: Extent to which survey respondents agree that specific actors can be trusted 
Overall, respondents reported slightly higher trust in government agencies than private companies, 
though the larger standard deviation is indicative of the greater range of responses for these 
organisations.  
Following on from Westin’s three ‘levels’ of privacy (Unconcerned, Pragmatist, and Fundamentalist), 
a cluster analysis was performed to classify survey respondents by their responses to the above-
mentioned questions, with results shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Median values regarding trust 
  High Trust Medium Trust Low Trust 
I think most people can be trusted. 4.03 3.19 2.19 
I believe most government agencies can be trusted. 4.10 3.01 1.49 
I believe most private companies can be trusted. 4.02 2.74 1.63 
Total N 58 97 72 
% N 25.6% 42.7% 31.7% 
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As may be expected, the “Medium Trust” group shows the highest number of responses overall, though 
the percentage of respondents in this category is lower than may have initially been expected. Of note is 
that the “High trust” group demonstrates a higher overall trust in government than both people in 
general and private companies, while the “Low trust” group demonstrates a lower trust in government 
than in the other groups, perhaps accounting for the higher standard deviation indicated above.  
We were further interested in exploring the characteristics of users in each of the three groups, to 
assess if socio-demographics contribute to perceptions of trust. Variables tested included age, income, 
housing tenure, education, and number of smart devices owned. A multinomial regression was run, with 
the ‘Low trust’ group serving as the reference variable. Resulting goodness of fit characteristics, seen in 
Table 3, indicate a good fit for the model. A Nagelkerke pseudo R-square value of .406 further indicates 
that the explored characteristics explain the trust categories reasonably well (approximately 40% of 
observed differences), though it would be useful to further explore additional variables. Table 4 shows the 
influence of the considered variables.  









Table 4: Model Fit Information II 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 360.52 0 0   
OwnTech 396.154 35.634 16 0.003 
Age category 380.832 20.312 14 0.121 
Income level 371.023 10.503 10 0.398 
Education 379.772 19.252 12 0.083 
Housing Tenure 376.279 15.759 8 0.046 
 
Characteristics with significant influence regarding category membership include the amount of 
technology owned and housing tenure (seen in bold). As might be expected, persons displaying high levels 
of trust are more likely to own more smart devices (36% of respondents in the ‘high trust’ category own 4 
or more devices, compared to 17% in the ‘low trust’ category). For housing, persons who rent from a 
housing association or council tend to report lower levels of trust than those who own their home or rent 
from a private landlord.  
Perceptions of Risk 
While understanding the characteristics that may correspond to trust categories is useful for 
ascertaining how a population may demonstrate trust characteristics, for our purposes it is perhaps more 
relevant to understand how these populations may consider risk in public IoT deployments. Respondents 
were asked to provide their ranking of concern regarding a series of fictional scenarios related to IoT 
deployments by government agencies and private companies. Significant association is seen between 
category membership and degree of concern over the posed scenarios, with a chi-square of 157.052 and a 
significance of .000 (88 degrees of freedom), and a Nagelkerke pseudo R-square of .565. Likelihood ratio 
fit is shown in Table 5, while average levels of concern displayed across all categories is shown in Table 6. 
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Table 5: Concern with different scenarios of public IoT deployments 
 
Table 6: Average concern with scenarios across all trust levels (0=No concern; 4=High concern) 































































The City Council has access to information on your home 
energy use via your smart meter
Concern_Council_SmartMeter 311.230 22.340 8 0.004
You are required to swipe a personal ID card in order to deposit 
rubbish in a bin
Concern_Council_RubbishID 302.652 13.761 8 0.088
You are required to register your pet with the Council, and 
microchip it to allow it to be located instantly
Concern_Council_PetRegister 301.313 12.422 8 0.133
Sensors are installed at key traffic crossings, allowing 
drivers committing traffic offences to be identified and 
ticketed by local police
Concern_Council_TrafficOffences 308.345 19.455 8 0.013
Sensors are installed along key traffic corridors allowing vehicle 
emissions to be monitored and non-compliant vehicles to be 
identified
Concern_Council_TrafficEmissions 295.186 6.296 8 0.614
Sensors are installed along local bodies of water to 
monitor for potential flooding
Concern_Flooding 320.101 31.210 8 0.000
A private company is able to track your home energy use via 
your smart meter
Concern_PC_SmartMeter 301.486 12.595 8 0.127
A private company offers you insurance incentives if you track 
and report your physical activity levels via a personal fitness 
device
Concern_PC_FitnessInsurance 298.697 9.807 8 0.279
A private company provides you with sensors that will 
automatically detect when you are running low on staple items 
(such as milk, toilet roll, or laundry detergent) and place an 
order for delivery
Concern_PC_AutoOrder 303.304 14.413 8 0.072
You or your child is given a toy that is able to record 
conversations and send them to the manufacturer
Concern_ChildToy 299.853 10.963 8 0.204
A smart kettle is installed in your place of work or 
education that records when the kettle is boiled and by 
whom
Concern_SmartKettle 313.736 24.845 8 0.002
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an 
effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.

















Of interest is that while there are significant differences in levels of concern regarding the above 
scenarios by trust category, these do not always follow expected patterns. In general, those persons 
falling in the ‘Medium’ trust category evidenced the lowest levels of concern for the scenarios presented, 
as seen in Table 7. Such figures may be placed into context when considering willingness to share 
information, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
Table 7: Average level of concern by trust category (0=No concern, 4=High concern) 




















Figure 5: Willingness to share information with private companies and government by trust category  
Here, we see that while respondents in the ‘Medium’ (or pragmatist) trust category have generally 
moderate options of the trustworthiness of different actors, when asked to consider sharing particular 
 1 
data with those actors, they may reflect less positive responses. This is particularly evident in cases where 
they are asked to share data with private companies, where they are, in the instances of personal and 
health information, less likely to demonstrate willingness to share data than those who demonstrate 
lower overall trust. The generally lower lack of concern shown in the scenarios presented above is 
therefore somewhat surprising. 
These results, however, may indicate behaviours in line with Nissenbaum’s concept of ‘contextual 
integrity’, which argues that privacy is transgressed when norms of either appropriateness or norms of 
flow/distribution are violated. From the survey responses, it is evident that respondents are generally in 
agreement regarding the ‘bounds’ of information sharing, with most reporting that they are most willing 
to share personal, housing, or health information with government agencies, which may be reflective of 
norms of appropriateness regarding the need to provide information to receive services in return. Social 
network information, however, is least likely to be shared, perhaps reflecting a lack of nexus – i.e. a lack of 
clear connection between the data collected and the purpose for which it is being collected. 
In general, the findings reflected in Tables 5, 6 and 7 indicate that all respondent clusters are least 
concerned about scenarios where there is a clear nexus between the data to be collected through the IoT 
sensors and the use of that data (for example, in the case of flood detection), or where a clear benefit to 
the consumer can be seen (for instance, in the pet sensor scenario). Those where the most concern is 
evidenced tend to have a less clear connection, or could be read to imply that data will be collected that 
may track personal behaviour either knowingly or unknowingly (as in the scenarios reflecting the child’s 
toy or rubbish ID, seen in Table 5).  
Preferences Regarding Information Provision 
The concerns identified above indicate that communication of the data use and handling practices 
that sit behind such deployments are not insignificant when considering trust. To further examine this, we 
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asked participants to indicate what information they would want available to them when presented with 
the following scenario: “A bus stop you use frequently has been instrumented with technologies that will 
turn on lights when a person is present. It does this by periodically turning on an audio sensor to 
determine if a conversation is taking place and by searching for Bluetooth- or WiFi-enabled devices such 
as smartphones. If a person or device is sensed, the light will turn on until such time as they leave the 
vicinity.” Participants were asked to select information that they would want to be posted at the stop, as 
well as what they would want to be available online, with the responses obtained shown in Table 8. 
As seen here, there is a clear preference for information to be available online, with all groups 
indicating higher preferences for this mode of communication in general, though with less differentiation 
across the low trust cluster. Obvious differences are also seen in the amount of information desired by 
each of the three clusters, with the low trust cluster demonstrating the highest preferences for 
information availability. To determine if these differences were statistically significant, an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was run to test the differences in information desired between clusters.  Those 
attributes that showed significant differences between clusters are shown in Table 9. 
Table 8: Information desired by trust cluster (attributes receiving ≥50% response are highlighted) 
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It is notable that key differences are seen in the information desired at the location of the deployment, 
particularly as this reflects the wide divergence between the requirements of the low trust cluster and 
those of the high and medium clusters. With the exception of information on the Manufacturer, a high 
proportion of persons in the low trust cluster indicated that they wanted all applicable information 
available both at the stop and online, though a slightly higher preference for online information was 
revealed. It is notable that ‘Privacy Policy’ did not rank particularly highly as a preference across the three 
categories. This may be indicative of the criticisms levied against privacy policies outlined above, as it is 
clear that there is information that is desired; however, this may be presented more effectively in a 
simplified format that responds directly to user preferences. 
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It is evident from the survey results analysed above that trust must be considered carefully with 
regards to public IoT deployments. Given the varying levels of trust identified across different actors and 
by the three clusters of respondents, it is clear that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to facilitating 
perceptions of trust in IoT systems. Considerations of risk identified indicate that the public are most 
concerned about deployments that have the potential to either track their personal behaviours and 
habits, or where no clear nexus is seen between the collection of data and the benefits obtained. This is 
also relevant when considering that ‘Purpose of collection’ was identified by all three groups as an 
informational element that would be desirable for a public IoT deployment. This is in line with previous 
work, which found that the intent and purpose behind public IoT deployments is information viewed as 
important by members of the public (Jacobs, et al. 2019).  
This finding is also aligned with reported willingness to share data. Clear differences are seen in 
responses regarding the sharing of different types of information with government agencies and private 
companies, both supporting the clustering of individuals by trust levels and Nissenbaum’s contextual 
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integrity argument. In reviewing the reported personal information sharing preferences of respondents, it 
is clear that all data are not viewed as equally sensitive. In general, people’s preferences reflected the 
utility of sharing information – in cases where private companies or government agencies may not be 
viewed as ‘needing’ to have access to certain data, the preference would be not to share. Distinctions 
seen between willingness to share with government agencies and private companies reflected this 
differentiation, with the ‘low trust’ cluster showing a distinct lack of trust in government agencies with 
respect to their personal data.  
Interestingly, the responses regarding concern with specific IoT scenarios reflected these findings, 
but also introduced an element of disaggregation. Again, issues of utility and nexus emerged fairly 
consistently, with those scenarios demonstrating a clear alignment between data collection and use 
ranking fairly low on the scale of concern. Also, as indicated in the findings regarding sensitivity of data as 
revealed through willingness to share, those scenarios that included both the potential tracking of 
personal behaviours and a lack of nexus were viewed as more concerning by respondents. The medium 
trust cluster, however, demonstrated the lowest level of concern with all scenarios presented, which was 
unexpected in the context of other findings. It is possible, however, that this is aligned with the 
pragmatism of this group – in general, their levels of trust are moderate; however, when presented with 
specific scenarios, the trade-off between privacy and utility may sway in favour of the latter. This finding 
warrants further exploration. 
Finally, with respect to information provision, the findings indicate, first, that there is a clear 
preference for hosting information on an available online source rather than providing all information at 
the location of the sensor deployment. While most participants did indicate that some information should 
be available at the scenario location (most notably, what data are collected and how they are protected), 
with the exception of the ‘low privacy’ cluster, respondents showed an overwhelming preference for 
having information available online.  
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There were, however, clear distinctions regarding what information should be provided across the 
three clusters. This finding would reflect a need to design different models of information provision 
depending on the trust characteristics of the user. It should be possible, for example, to design three 
separate information interfaces for users depending upon their trust levels that would provide sufficient 
information to ensure their comfort, without requiring them to read through information they feel is 
unnecessary. Such an approach might encourage users to engage with the information provided and 
become informed members of the IoT ecosystem. This, in turn, would allow users to have more feelings of 
control, as they would be provided with a clearer and more direct understanding of the data collection 
purpose and practices, tailored to their preferences. While a ‘plain language’ approach is consistent with 
requirements put forward under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), discussed below, the 
general lack of desire for access to a privacy policy indicates that the conveyance of information to the 
consumer in such scenarios should be presented in a manner that addresses their actual concerns. 
 
Implications of Findings for Regulatory Purposes 
According to (Greenleaf 2019), the number of countries that had enacted privacy laws from 2017-2018 
had risen by 10%, from 120 to 132. This increase is demonstrative of the heightened recognition that 
privacy is receiving, particularly in the context of increased data collection across technology applications. 
While the GDPR, enacted in May 2018, has received perhaps the greatest recognition (due to a number of 
factors including geographic scope, severity of penalties for non-compliance, and requirements for data 
protection by design (Albrecht 2016), additional regulations have been enacted or updated in places 
including California, Maine, and Nevada in the United States; Brazil; and India (the later two of which have 
been modelled after the GDPR) (Determann 2020). Taking the GDPR as an exemplar, the following 
requirements, summarized by the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (UK ICO N.D.) are particularly 
pertinent to IoT deployments given the preceding discussion: 
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 “Individuals have the right to be informed about the collection and use of their personal data; 
  You must provide individuals with information including: your purposes for processing their 
personal data, your retention periods for that personal data, and who it will be shared with. We 
call this ‘privacy information’; 
 The information you provide to people must be concise, transparent, intelligible, easily accessible, 
and it must use clear and plain language (UK ICO N.D.).” 
Of note is that these requirements pertain directly to ‘personal data’, which is defined under the GDPR as: 
… any information which are related to an identified or identifiable natural person. The data 
subjects are identifiable if they can be directly or indirectly identified, especially by reference 
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or one of several special characteristics, which expresses the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, commercial, cultural or social identity of these natural persons (GDPR 2016).  
Determining whether data collected by IoT sensors in smart city environments is ‘personal’ is thus 
pertinent to discussions of requirements for information conveyance; however, the potential for collected 
data to be linked across platforms in a way that makes it personally identifying is not insignificant 
(European Commission 2012). Privacy-by-design approaches may experience trade-offs between the 
anonymization of data and the utility of data, and be susceptible to exploitation by malicious actors (Veale 
et al, 2019). It may therefore be advisable to respond to these requirements, particularly in public spaces, 
as identification of individuals may be possible based on information collected.  
The findings of the survey discussed above are reflective of emerging regulatory requirements, 
though we also found that additional information about systems and their operation is also often desired. 
The requirements that such information be ‘concise’ and ‘easily accessible’ are also pertinent here, 
perhaps most closely aligned with attitudes towards privacy policies, which tend to be neither. A difficulty 
for IoT deployments in public spaces, however, is how to provide this information in a manner that is 
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informative, visible and accessible. As indicated from the survey responses analysed above, respondents 
desire access to relevant information, including who to contact to find out more about the sensors. This 
contact, however, may not be immediately evident, particularly given likely underlying complexities 
within the deployment of IoT devices in public spaces – though many cities have deployed such sensing 
devices, they have often partnered or contracted with third-party technology developers, who may have 
ownership rights over or control access to collected data (as described in (Jacobs, et al. 2019) and (Perera, 
et al. 2014)). This is germane not only in the context of GDPR requirements for notification and 
communication, but also with reference to degrees of trust and willingness to share data indicated across 
the high, medium, and low privacy categories discussed above. The complexities of data ownership and 
access rights seen in public-space deployments of IoT devices may make clear demarcations of use and 
processing unclear, thus the communication of practices at the outset may be useful in engendering trust 
across all privacy preference categories. 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
In this paper, we have used a UK survey to explore issues of trust, privacy of personal information, 
and risks associated with public deployments of Internet of Things sensors. Findings indicate that, as the 
‘smart city’ evolves, attention must be paid to consumer preferences regarding trust; information 
collection, sharing and use; and the methods of communication used to convey data practices. Public IoT 
networks introduce levels of contextual complexity that may not be addressed through conventional 
methods of communication; thus, further attention must be paid to this area in order to develop 
sufficiently robust and acceptable communication practices. Introducing such considerations at the 
system design stage, and aligning the method of communication with the technology deployed and 
location of deployment, will allow for more effective decisions to be made and will hopefully support 
 1 
public acceptance of IoT devices. In addition, taking such an approach will provide more effective and 
robust responses to evolving regulatory requirements. 
Due to the complexity of IoT networks indicated above, it could also be argued that leveraging the 
use of intelligent infrastructures and Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be an essential requirement to support 
consumer trust in future smart city development projects. Such an approach would create the need for 
vocabularies to allow developers to describe their IoT systems and deliver machine-understandable 
transparency. To address this, the TrustLens project has begun exploring semantic models 
for characterising IoT infrastructures in terms of their plans (i.e. expected behaviours), execution traces 
(i.e. actual behaviours) and additional contextual information such as data protection policies and physical 
deployment context (Markovic, et al. 2019). The results of the survey reported in this paper highlight the 
types of information that need to be captured by such models (e.g. what data are being recorded, what 
are the data being used for, who manages the IoT system, etc.) in order to allow effective translation to 
the public sphere. In addition, the survey suggests that consumers may be receptive to more aggregated 
information availability on IoT systems, particularly if these are presented in a tailored fashion that 
responds to the user preferences. The potential for this approach to be taken represents an area for 
further exploration within smart city design and development.  
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